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An Information Processing View on Joint Vendor Performance in 
Multi-Sourcing: The Role of the Guardian 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines joint vendor performance in multi-sourcing arrangements. Using 
an Information Processing View, we argue that managing interdependencies between 
multiple vendors imposes substantial information processing (IP) requirements on 
clients. To achieve high joint performance, clients therefore need to possess sufficient 
IP capacity. We examine how three sources of IP capacity, two internal (i.e., the client’s 
inter-vendor governance and the client’s architectural knowledge) and one external (i.e., 
the guardian vendor), work together in realizing joint performance. Our results show 
that formal governance and architectural knowledge contribute to joint performance. 
The guardian vendor contributes to joint performance in settings where the client 
deploys strong governance but lacks architectural knowledge. This suggests that, 
contrary to common views in the literature, guardian vendors should not be understood 
as mediators (or single points of contact) who relieve clients from governance efforts. 
Instead, guardian vendors are more fruitfully understood as architects, who 
complement the client’s governance efforts by compensating for knowledge gaps. Put 
simply, client firms should consider using a guardian vendor to compensate for weak 
architectural knowledge while still maintaining strong formal and informal governance 
of all vendors. 
Keywords: multi-sourcing, joint performance, guardian, governance, architectural 
knowledge, information processing view 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the information systems (IS) domain, multi-sourcing is viewed as the practice of 
procuring interdependent information technology (IT) and business services from 
external vendors to achieve optimal business goals [4]. Such a definition brings to the 
fore the interdependencies between outsourced tasks delivered by various vendors, thus 
implying the need for interactions between the vendors in order to jointly deliver an 
overall service [4, 49]. In assessing the success of a multi-sourcing arrangement, it is 
not the performance of the individual vendors that matters most, but their joint 
performance, i.e., the degree to which the combined services delivered by the vendors 
meet the client’s expectations. An example of such a multi-sourcing arrangement is 
British Airways’ (BA’s) “Know Me Programme”, which was initiated in 2013 and 
involves three vendors, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), Opera Solutions, and e-
Dialog (now Zeta Interactive)1. Together, these three vendors form a new personalized 
customer contact system. Although each vendor has its own responsibilities, i.e., TCS 
for collecting, integrating, and managing customer data, Opera Solutions for providing 
business analytics services, and e-Dialog for creating e-mail-based marketing services, 
the success of the project relies on all three services working together. Accordingly, the 
vendors have to manage the interdependencies between their services, which requires 
them to cooperate and coordinate their actions. This example resonates with Bapna et 
al.’s [4] claim that: “In contrast to dyadic client-vendor relationships that have been the 
subject of extant global sourcing research, multi-sourcing necessitates individual and 
collaborative efforts of multiple vendors at the back-end to come together to create a 
seamless, integrated service at the front end for the client” (p. 786). While facets 
associated with governance of dyadic relationships, such as putting in place Service 
                                                        
1  e-Dialog was part of GSI Commerce (which was acquired by eBay and renamed eBay Enterprise in 2013), and sold to Zeta 
Interactive in 2015 (http://zetaglobal.com/clients). 
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Level Agreements (SLAs) and using various organizational controls to motivate 
vendors to achieve desirable results [47], are also relevant, the client firm needs to put 
greater effort into governing the vendor network in IT multi-sourcing [31], as well as 
incentivizing and monitoring both individual and joint vendor performance [4]. On this 
account, the use of a guardian vendor to assist the client firm in governing the vendor 
network [e.g., 4, 49] has been portrayed as one of the unique features of the IS multi-
sourcing setting2.  
While a few studies have examined multi-sourcing in the IS context3 [4, 6, 12, 31, 42, 
49], we still know little about interactions and collaboration between multiple vendors 
and the effects on joint performance. In this regard, research has shed light on the 
importance of appropriate task design (e.g., modularization) and task distribution 
among vendors (e.g., choosing specialized vendors while ensuring sufficient 
knowledge overlaps between them) [49]. However, little is known about how the client 
can facilitate and support vendors to achieve successful joint performance. Moreover, 
it is not clear how the client’s support role is affected if the client assigns one of the 
vendors the position of guardian, i.e., the responsibility for managing the other vendors. 
Currently, the literature suggests that the guardian vendor acts as a mediator, thus 
standing between the client and the other vendors [49]. This implies that the guardian 
substitutes the client in facilitating and supporting coordination and cooperation 
activities among the vendors [4, 49]. Alternatively, we propose that the guardian may 
                                                        
2 It is important to note that the IS outsourcing literature has so far conceptually discussed the role of the guardian and suggested 
that it corresponds with the notion of a mediator. More specifically, two key studies have explored the guardian role: Bapna et al. 
[4] is a research commentary and largely conceptual; second, while Wiener and Saunders [49] report a case study that follows 
a direct rather than a guardian model, with some suggestions made regarding the guardian.  
3 Multi-vendor settings have been broadly studied in the supply chain literature [e.g., 1] in the context of production, logistics and 
procurement of physical goods (e.g., automotive and manufacturing industries), where clients use multiple suppliers to procure 
similar/identical physical parts. In the case of IT-enabled business processes and services, each vendor is delivering a unique 
yet interdependent service (as illustrated in the British Airways example in the Introduction). Thus the nature of the 
interdependencies and joint performance in IT multi-sourcing that are the focus of this paper is different to the interdependencies 
in triadic relationships between suppliers of physical parts discussed in the literature [e.g., 10]. 
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improve joint performance by providing capacities that complement those of the client. 
It is within these areas of interest that this paper seeks to advance our understanding of 
multi-sourcing settings by addressing the following questions: (i) How does the client 
facilitate joint vendor performance in a multi-sourcing arrangement?; and (ii) What 
role does the guardian vendor play in achieving joint performance? 
We frame the challenge of achieving joint vendor performance (hereafter, joint 
performance) as an information processing (IP) issue. Hence, the challenge of 
achieving joint performance in a multi-sourcing arrangement is essentially one of 
effective IP to manage interdependencies between the vendors and between the client 
and the vendors, thus imposing considerable IP requirements. For instance, in the 
example above regarding British Airways, IP is needed to understand the functional 
and technical system requirements of the client (BA), and also to understand the 
interdependencies that exist between TCS’ customer data management systems and 
processes, Opera Solutions’ data analytics processes, and E-dialog’s email platform. 
While such IP requirements may vary between multi-sourcing arrangements, e.g. 
according to the degree of modularization [44], the involvement of numerous vendors 
and the interdependencies between them will pose challenges to the client in achieving 
joint performance if the client does not ensure sufficient and relevant IP capacity. In 
this regard, governance (formal and informal) and architectural knowledge have 
repeatedly been suggested as key factors affecting IP capacities [7, 15, 33].  
Consequently, we examined how clients can ensure joint performance by assuming 
sufficient IP capacities in multi-sourcing arrangements [15, 48], to support our claim 
that such IP capacities may be brought in by the client (i.e., as an internal IP capacity) 
or by the guardian vendor (i.e., as an external IP capacity) [4, 49]. We also aimed to 
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clarify whether the guardian vendor will have a substitutional or a complementary 
effect on the client’s IP capacities.  
Using an international data set of 189 IT multi-sourcing arrangements, we found that 
two internal IP capacities complement each other. Indeed, the client’s formal inter-
vendor governance and the client’s architectural knowledge positively affect joint 
performance, while informal inter-vendor governance has a significant effect on joint 
performance only when interacting with high architectural knowledge. With regard to 
the external source of IP capacity, we found that a guardian vendor complements the 
client’s formal and informal inter-vendor governance while substituting the client’s 
architectural knowledge. Thus, the guardian model is beneficial in settings where the 
client provides the formal framework for the guardian vendor to interact with the other 
vendors, where the client remains involved in this interaction, and where the client lacks 
architectural knowledge. This implies that, contrary to what has been suggested in the 
existing literature (i.e., [49] and [4]), the role of the guardian vendor may be more 
fruitfully understood as one of an architect rather than a mediator. The guardian 
compensates for the client’s knowledge gaps, while the client still needs to engage in 
formal and informal governance of all vendors. 
Next, we provide theoretical foundations and develop hypotheses. We then explain the 
method and findings, followed by a discussion of the results and their implications for 
research and practice. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The Information Processing View and Multi-Sourcing  
The Information Processing View (IPV) is a broad theoretical perspective that views 
entities (e.g., people, teams, organizations, and inter-organizational relationships) as 
information processing (IP) systems, and explains the structures and behaviors of these 
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systems by referring to their IP limitations [15, 25]. An important property of IP 
systems is their IP capacity, broadly defined as their ability to interpret, integrate, store, 
and transmit information [32 (p.42)]. One prominent stream of IPV research [15, 32] 
focuses on the IP capacity that is generated by governance mechanisms, namely 
“mechanisms for coordination and control” [48 (p. 618)]. Governance mechanisms, 
such as goal setting, planning, and direct interaction, generate IP capacity because they 
provide the information infrastructure through which the constituent elements of IP 
systems align actions (i.e., achieve coordination) and interests (i.e., achieve 
cooperation) [2, 5, 37]. A second stream of IPV research focuses on IP capacity 
generated by knowledge. It draws on a cognitive IP perspective to argue that IP capacity 
depends on existing knowledge, because existing knowledge provides the infrastructure 
that enables humans to assimilate and integrate new information [9, 13]. Building on 
these two streams, we seek to examine how IP capacity within the multi-sourcing 
environment affects joint performance.  
Indeed, the use of the IPV appears particularly suited to the context of multi-sourcing 
in light of the following four gaps. First, multi-sourcing research lacks an overarching 
theory that fits with the idiosyncrasies of multi-sourcing as opposed to single-sourcing. 
In our view, what makes multi-sourcing unique is its inherent complexity, which is 
based on interdependencies between vendors – as opposed to the client-vendor 
interdependencies of dyadic outsourcing.  While IPV has been applied to studying 
dyadic relationships [e.g., 5, 32], where IP requirements may substantially vary from 
case to case, we argue that triadic settings, such as multi-sourcing, add a layer of 
complexity that warrants focus on the composition of IP capacities. The 
interdependencies that exist between tasks allocated to multiple vendors pose 
significant IP requirements for the client.  In particular, in comparison to single-
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sourcing, the need to integrate sub-services or tasks outsourced to different vendors into 
a coherent whole creates additional IP requirements in multi-sourcing. Therefore, it is 
imperative to understand joint performance by modeling and testing the effects of 
certain IP capacities available within the multi-sourcing arrangement.  
Second, the two streams of IPV research, one focusing on governance and the other on 
knowledge as sources of IP capacity, have mostly been developed in isolation. 
Consequently, understanding the relationship between architectural knowledge and 
governance in multi-sourcing and how these two IP capacities interact is imperative for 
both IS outsourcing and IPV research knowledge.  
Third, the IS outsourcing literature [40] and the literature on multi-sourcing have, so 
far, mostly treated performance as an aggregate of the performances of the individual 
vendors [e.g., 20]. In this paper, however, we emphasize that what makes multi-
sourcing unique is that performance consists of more than the sum of the contributions 
of individual vendors. As such, it is imperative to develop an understanding of the 
combined or joint performance, rather than the individual contributions of the vendors. 
Last but not least, the few references in the extant academic and professional4 literature 
to the role that the guardian vendor plays in multi-sourcing settings [4, 49] raise 
questions about the contribution of this actor to joint performance. We argue that the 
guardian brings its own unique set of IP capacities that can either complement or 
substitute the IP capacities provided by the client5. 
The Client’s Challenge: With or Without a Guardian Vendor 
IP capacity can be provided by either the client or the guardian vendor, if the client has 
                                                        
4 http://www.computerweekly.com/blog/Investigating-Outsourcing/IT-sourcing-models-are-shifting-A-Deloitte-perspective. 
5 As put by Tiwana [46], “Two things are complements if more of one increases the benefits of using the other. They are 
substitutes if more of one diminishes the benefits of using the other” (p.88).  
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appointed one vendor to act as guardian (see Figure 1b6). In the direct model (see Figure 
1a), the client takes full responsibility for managing the vendors. In the guardian model, 
the client transfers some responsibilities to the guardian vendor. We argue that each 
model has important implications for the IP capacities needed to achieve a high joint 
performance.  
 
  
   
a. Direct model b. Guardian model 
Figure 1: Direct and Guardian Models  
 
In the direct model, the client relies on two sources of IP capacity, namely governance 
and architectural knowledge. Governance in dyadic outsourcing relationships often 
manifests as formal and informal governance between a client and a vendor [36]. 
However, in multi-sourcing, informal and formal governance are likely to be required 
to support the coordination of actions between multiple vendors, thus suggesting a need 
for inter-vendor governance, i.e., joint governance structures between the multiple 
                                                        
6 This is different from situations where the prime contractor is used, because in such a scenario the prime contractor is the only 
vendor contracted by the client and thus responsible for delivering the service. In the academic and professional literature, the 
prime contractor model “consists of a network with several vendors that operate under the control of the head contractor. The 
head contractor is accountable for the delivery of the service and liable for this under the terms of the contract” [34, p.134]. For 
example, Koo et al. [29] refer to the prime contractor outsourcing configuration as the “single-vendor-dominant model” where “a 
client directly contracts with one dominant vendor and indirectly contracts with other vendors through the dominant vendor” (p. 
3). Such contracting should not be confused with a true multi-sourcing scenario, where each vendor is contracted directly by the 
client firm, as depicted in Figure 1a.    
 10 
vendors and the client firm. In line with the psychological IPV research stream, we 
argue that information processing requires appropriate knowledge to guide governance, 
in particular the client’s architectural knowledge [24, 38, 43].  
While the conditions for achieving joint performance by utilizing the client’s IP 
capacities are clear, it is still unclear how the choice of a guardian model affects these 
conditions. Currently, the few IS outsourcing studies that have discussed the guardian 
role suggest the guardian acts as a mediator, i.e., as an actor standing between the client 
and the rest of the vendors, thus relieving the client from facilitating coordination and 
cooperation between vendors [4, 49]. To perform such a role, the guardian brings in its 
own IP capacity. From the client’s perspective, therefore, the guardian acts as an 
external source of IP capacity, applying its own inter-vendor governance as well as its 
own architectural knowledge.  
However, the view of guardian vendor as a mediator can be challenged. As reported in 
numerous sources7, the client maintains an individual contractual agreement with each 
vendor in the multi-sourcing setting, while the guardian vendor does not have legally 
binding contractual agreements with any of the vendors. Consequently, the guardian 
vendor’s ability to enforce inter-vendor governance is in fact rather limited, particularly 
as the guardian vendor is restricted in the range of penalties and incentives it can use 
when governing the other vendors. Hence, it is unclear whether the guardian vendor 
does indeed assume a mediating role, as proposed in the literature [e.g., 4, 49]. Evidence 
from similar settings in manufacturing and construction predominantly suggests that 
the guardian vendor brings in superior knowledge about integrating the various 
contributions of individual vendors [7]. As such, an alternative view to the role of the 
guardian as a mediator is the guardian as an architect. This describes the guardian 
                                                        
7 E.g. https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/2535633/multi-sourcing-a-different-way-of-contracting.pdf. 
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vendor as assisting the client in managing the multi-sourcing arrangement by 
complementing the client’s IP capacities, rather than substituting them. 
Thus, there are two views of the guardian vendor’s role in multi-sourcing. In one, the 
guardian substitutes the client’s inter-vendor governance (guardian-as-a-mediator) and, 
in the other, the guardian vendor complements the client’s inter-vendor governance 
(guardian-as-an-architect).  
With this in mind, we now turn to theorizing the effect of internal and external sources 
of IP capacity on joint performance. 
HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we use the IPV lens to derive hypotheses aimed at examining the effect 
of internal and external sources of IP capacity on joint performance. Figure 2 depicts 
our conceptual model. 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Research Model 
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The Client’s Sources of Internal IP Capacity 
The client’s inter-vendor governance  
According to the IPV, governance is considered an important source of IP capacity [15]. 
In the context of multi-sourcing, it is manifested in inter-vendor governance efforts 
directed at achieving coordination and cooperation among multiple vendors. The 
literature distinguishes between formal and informal governance mechanisms [26, 36]. 
Formal, or mechanistic, governance relies on pre-specified plans (or programs, 
procedures, and behaviors) and goals (or outcomes), and includes efforts toward 
specifying, monitoring, and enforcing these plans and goals. Thus, formal inter-vendor 
governance includes procedures that specify how vendors shall collaborate to achieve 
joint performance. As an example of a joint procedural mechanism, Wiener and 
Saunders [49] described how a client firm set up a support team made up of 
representatives from each vendor for the duration of the contract. In this type of formal 
arrangement, vendors’ representatives are able to communicate with each other in order 
to coordinate work on interdependent tasks, while the client firm maintains 
communications with all vendors to ensure compliance with the contract requirements8. 
In contrast to such formal governance, informal or organic governance relies on ad hoc 
communication between people [36]. The IPV literature refers to informal governance 
as lateral relationships that allow for joint decision processes across levels of authority 
[15]. In the context of multi-sourcing, this means communication is facilitated across 
different hierarchical levels between the client and all vendors. Hence, we 
conceptualize informal inter-vendor governance as more or less frequently undertaken 
efforts for joint communication, i.e., communication involving the client and all 
vendors that cuts across different hierarchical levels. For example, client 
                                                        
8 https://www.information-age.com/how-to-make-multi-sourcing-work-123457348/ 
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representatives may meet with corresponding staff from all vendors in order to resolve 
accountability issues [49]. In line with prior IPV studies, we anticipate that both formal 
and informal inter-vendor governance generate IP capacity and as a result help to 
improve joint performance [14, 21, 26, 32]. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
H1: The stronger the client’s formal and informal inter-vendor governance, the higher 
the joint performance. 
The client’s architectural knowledge  
While the client can generate IP capacity through governance efforts to support 
coordination and cooperation between vendors, the cognitive stream of the IPV 
literature suggests that effective IP also depends on underlying knowledge. In this 
regard, in order to improve joint performance, it is imperative that the client brings in 
relevant knowledge on how the different services outsourced to different vendors 
should work together. Indeed, past research in the related domain of product 
development has shown that firms engaging in multi-sourcing have invested in 
developing abilities to integrate components delivered from various vendors [7, 24, 43]. 
Specifically, architectural knowledge is seen as a crucial resource that firms should 
retain or develop if choosing to source from multiple vendors [7, 43]. For example, in 
their analysis of specialization in knowledge production, Brusoni et al. [7] reported that 
although one manufacturer had fully outsourced the development of aircraft engine 
control systems to multiple vendors, the manufacturer still made significant efforts to 
develop and retain its architectural knowledge, i.e., “knowledge about the ways in 
which the components are integrated and linked together into a coherent whole” [23, p. 
11]. Possessing such architectural knowledge improves the clients’ ability to ensure 
joint performance in multi-sourcing arrangements [7, p. 614].  
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Thus, we argue that in addition to the governance efforts discussed above, a major 
factor determining a client’s IP capacity for managing a multi-sourcing arrangement is 
the client’s architectural knowledge. With the benefit of architectural knowledge, the 
client is then able to cope with the interdependencies between the outsourced sub-tasks 
and manage interfaces between services delivered by individual vendors. Therefore, we 
posit: 
H2: The higher the degree of a client’s architectural knowledge, the higher the joint 
performance. 
The two sources of IP capacity discussed above – the client’s inter-vendor governance 
and architectural knowledge – are likely to have complementary effects on joint 
performance. It is in inter-vendor governance efforts that the client can bring its 
knowledge to bear to improve the management of interdependencies. Knowledgeable 
clients are able to anticipate dependencies when they are specifying formal plans for 
joint action [19, 36]. They may also have a greater ability to interpret information about 
actual behaviors or outcomes than less knowledgeable clients [7]. For example, they 
may be able to determine which vendor is accountable for a faulty delivery and leverage 
this information during formal and informal governance to avoid finger pointing [4]. 
Indeed Wiener and Saunders [49] illustrated such a case, arguing that “consistent with 
the competitive paradigm, when vendors are part of a sourcing arrangement involving 
multiple, interdependent vendors, they act in ways to make their performance look 
better than their competitors’ and try to develop advantages over them (e.g., a vendor 
may seek to blame the other vendors for project or service delivery problems)” (p. 212). 
Resolving such conflict requires both governance and architectural knowledge [28]. A 
knowledgeable client, who well understands the nature of the interdependencies 
between the vendors, is likely to be able to apply appropriate informal and formal inter-
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vendor governance mechanisms that address the core of such conflict within the multi-
sourcing arrangement. Clearly, lacking the required understanding of 
interdependencies would prevent the client firm from enacting appropriate inter-vendor 
governance mechanisms to resolve the problem. In sum, both formal and informal inter-
vendor governing efforts are likely to be more effective for joint performance when the 
client has a strong architectural knowledge. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H3: A higher degree of architectural knowledge held by the client strengthens the 
positive association between inter-vendor governance and joint performance.  
A Guardian Vendor as a Source of External IP Capacity 
Our earlier examination of the guardian vendor’s role suggests that the guardian may 
serve alternative purposes as a mediator or as an architect. The guardian in either role 
has differing implications for the client firm. For the guardian as a mediator, it is 
expected that the client firm would retreat from governance efforts now to be carried 
out by the guardian vendor. For the guardian as an architect, the client firm would retain 
governance effort while benefiting from the guardian’s architectural knowledge. As the 
literature has so far only considered the guardian’s mediator role, here we propose a 
competing explanation and seek to theorize the effect of each role on joint performance.  
The guardian-as-a-mediator perspective 
Viewing the guardian vendor as a mediator suggests that the guardian vendor is 
positioned between the client and the other vendor(s) in the multi-sourcing arrangement. 
Seen through an IPV lens, the guardian-as-a-mediator receives and interprets 
information from the client (such as information about the overall service expected 
from all the vendors working together), conveys the information to the other vendors, 
and receives, interprets, and conveys information from the vendors back to the client. 
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In line with this perspective, Wiener and Saunders [49] argue that “the guardian vendor 
[…] coordinates the other vendors on the client’s behalf” (p. 213). This assertion 
implies that the client retreats from inter-vendor governance, handing over this 
responsibility to the guardian vendor. The two internal sources of IP capacity, inter-
vendor governance and the client’s architectural knowledge, are then likely to become 
less important or even detrimental for joint performance. 
Regarding the first, high amounts of inter-vendor governance by the client could even 
be detrimental to joint performance because confusion may arise if the guardian vendor 
believes it is to exercise inter-vendor governance, but the client continues to do so as 
well. A client who actively exercises inter-vendor governance would be at odds with 
the “single point of contact” [49, p. 213] principle inherent to the guardian-as-a-
mediator perspective. Such parallel governance efforts are likely to result in 
coordination failures and accountability challenges.  
The client’s architectural knowledge is also likely to become less important with a 
guardian model based on the guardian-as-a-mediator perspective. Since the client 
retreats from inter-vendor governance, it is likely to have far fewer occasions to bring 
to bear its own knowledge. The occasions in which the client does bring to bear its own 
knowledge are then largely limited to interactions with the guardian vendor. So, 
although architectural knowledge may still be beneficial in helping to govern the 
guardian vendor more effectively, it is likely to be less critical than in the case of a 
direct model. 
In sum, we argue that should the guardian assume the role of a mediator, it is plausible 
to suggest that the IP capacities of the client will be substituted by the IP capacity 
generated through the guardian model.  We therefore assert that:  
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H4a/b: The choice of the guardian model weakens the positive effects (a) of the client’s 
inter-vendor governance and (b) of the client’s architectural knowledge on joint 
performance. 
The guardian-as-an-architect perspective 
An alternative perspective to the guardian-as-a-mediator is the guardian-as-an-architect. 
This suggests that the guardian vendor contributes to joint performance by bringing in 
architectural knowledge that supports the client’s governance efforts, rather than 
relieving the client from engaging in inter-vendor governance. In this perspective, the 
guardian vendor has a complementary relationship with the client regarding inter-
vendor governance and a substitutive relationship with the client regarding architectural 
knowledge, as we will argue next. 
According to the guardian-as-an-architect perspective, we expect a complementary 
relationship with the client’s inter-vendor governance for two reasons. First, the 
guardian vendor brings in valuable knowledge, such as knowledge of governance 
structures effective for multi-sourcing relationships [31], and of the service architecture 
that underlies the multi-sourcing arrangement. As we argued earlier, knowledge is 
likely to make governance more effective [7, 28], as the client managers are able to 
leverage this knowledge to improve their inter-vendor governance. Second, while the 
guardian vendor may lack the formal authority and thus legitimacy to enact effective 
governance, the client maintains a high level of involvement in this capacity. Indeed, 
the client is the only party with legally binding contractual agreements with all the 
vendors [4, 12]. High levels of inter-vendor governance by the client paired with a 
guardian model allow multi-sourcing arrangements to leverage the client’s authority 
and the guardian vendor’s knowledge at the same time. In sum, we expect that the 
external IP capacity generated through the knowledge brought in by the guardian will 
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complement the internal IP capacity generated through the client’s inter-vendor 
governance. These ideas echo Bapna et al.’s [4] view of the governance efforts of the 
client in the presence of a guardian vendor, in that: “[…] not only does the client still 
engage in multilateral contracts with multiple vendors but also has to consider the 
guardian’s ability to ensure cooperation and coordination in determining its overall 
relationship structure” (p. 794).  
In the guardian-as-an-architect perspective, while the guardian vendor complements the 
client’s inter-vendor governance, it substitutes the client’s architectural knowledge. 
Without the presence of a guardian vendor, the client requires strong architectural 
knowledge in order to exercise effective governance (e.g., to tackle accountability 
problems and to design effective plans for coordination). Conversely, the client’s 
architectural knowledge is likely to be less critical (although still beneficial) in the 
presence of a guardian vendor. If a client lacks architectural knowledge, the guardian 
vendor can compensate by providing guidance on how to set up and exercise effective 
inter-vendor governance. Thus, the positive effect of the client’s architectural 
knowledge on joint performance is likely to be weaker in the guardian model than in 
the direct model. This corresponds to a substitutive relationship [46, p. 88], whereby 
the benefits from the architectural knowledge held by the client decrease with the 
choice of the guardian model. Seen through the IPV, the external IP capacity generated 
through the guardian vendor’s knowledge partially substitutes the internal IP capacity 
generated through the client’s architectural knowledge. In conclusion, the guardian-as-
an-architect perspective leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H5a/b: The choice of the guardian model (a) strengthens the positive effect of the 
client’s governance on joint performance, while (b) weakening the positive effect of the 
client’s architectural knowledge on joint performance.  
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Control Variables 
While our research model focuses on sources of IP capacity and their interactions, we 
have also controlled for a number of other relationships established in the outsourcing 
and IPV literature. First, we controlled for modularity. Modularity refers to the degree 
to which the outsourced sub-tasks can be easily combined into a coherent whole [39, 
44]. Outsourcing arrangements of high modularity rely on well-defined, standardized 
interfaces that facilitate the integration of the sub-tasks performed by the different 
parties [3, 6, 44]. From an IPV perspective, such modularity is a key determinant of IP 
requirements [44]. Modular arrangements may ease the composition and integration of 
sub-tasks outsourced to different vendors and, thereby, lower IP requirements. 
Accordingly, modularity may increase joint performance independent of the IP capacity 
available in a multi-sourcing arrangement. Second, in line with the existing IPV 
research, we controlled for interactions of IP requirements with sources of IP capacity 
[2, 32]. Specifically, it can be argued that high modularity lowers the need for IP 
capacities to satisfy the client’s expectations of joint vendor performance. We therefore 
controlled for interactions between modularity and formal and informal governance, 
the client’s architectural knowledge, and the choice of the guardian model. Moreover, 
we controlled for concentration (i.e., the degree to which a large fraction of the project 
work is allocated to a few vendors) [27], age of the arrangement (i.e., the number of 
years since the creation of the multi-sourcing arrangement), client size (as indicated by 
the number of employees), client country, client industry, and tasks included in the 
arrangement (business process outsourcing, application development). We also 
controlled for the interaction between concentration and choice of the guardian model. 
Low concentration indicates that many vendors are involved in the multi-sourcing 
arrangement. The lower the concentration, the more difficult it may be for the guardian 
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vendor to manage the large number of other vendors, suggesting a possible interaction 
effect between concentration and the choice of the guardian model.  
METHODS 
Data 
We empirically tested the theoretical framework (Figure 2) using a survey 
questionnaire  and “key informants” methodology for data collection [35], in line with 
past IS outsourcing studies [e.g., 17]. The data were collected in 2012 and 2013 with 
the help of a UK-based market research firm.  
The questionnaire was administered to organizations across different countries, 
including the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the US, and spanning a variety 
of industries. For this purpose, the original English version of the questionnaire was 
translated by the market research firm and checked by native speakers (chosen by the 
authors) who were familiar with the study context to ensure the correctness of the 
translation. Responses were collected using both telephone interviews and an online 
survey. 
The questionnaire was distributed among potential middle and top-level informants 
who were familiar with multi-sourcing arrangements within their firms. To ensure the 
targeted individuals’ familiarity with multi-sourcing arrangements (so qualifying them 
as a “key informant”), the respondents needed to answer a set of screening questions 
and meet the following criteria9: 
- Being employed by an organization with at least 250 employees, 
                                                        
9 The market research firm used these criteria to select key informants from a panel of individuals that had agreed to participate 
in surveys.  
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- Having an outsourcing arrangement(s) in place where the organization had 
consciously divided a task or project into particular sub-tasks or sub-projects 
that were outsourced to different vendors, and 
- Having familiarity with the management of such a multi-sourcing arrangement 
in her or his company. 
The respondent then had to select one particular multi-sourcing arrangement currently 
in place in their company and with which they were familiar. Within this particular 
multi-sourcing arrangement, the respondent was asked to select the two vendors 
contributing the most to the multi-sourcing arrangement (in terms of amount of work). 
The questions relevant for testing our model pertained only to this particular multi-
sourcing arrangement with the two chosen vendors, subsequently called vendor A and 
B throughout the questionnaire. Our study and empirical testing thus focused on one 
particular “triad” within the multi-sourcing arrangement [10], each triad consisting of 
the client and two key vendors. Focusing on triads ensured that the unit of analysis was 
the same for all respondents.  
Before sending out the final questionnaire, the questionnaire items were pilot-tested 
with 15 international organizations to ensure that all items could be understood and 
answered by the intended group of respondents. Each block of questions was followed 
by an open field for comments, where respondents were asked to note down any 
thoughts they had on the questions asked in the preceding section. The comments were 
considered in the refinement of the questionnaire and some amendments were 
introduced to improve the clarity of questions. In addition, we tested our model on the 
pilot data to assess the validity of the constructs. Items that loaded very low were 
removed from the questionnaire. 
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The finalized questionnaire was sent out to 2000 organizations. Overall, 200 usable 
questionnaires were made available after several follow-ups with the sample 
organizations. From these 200 cases, we excluded 10 after reviewing the descriptions 
of outsourced tasks. We excluded cases when the sub-tasks assigned to different 
vendors were not interdependent (e.g., outsourcing IT procurement to vendor A and 
sales advice to vendor B), or when the outsourced tasks did not match our target 
services, which comprised IT services and IT-supported business processes. For 
example, in one case the services were “providing a camera crew” (vendor A) and 
“providing special equipment for camera crew services” (vendor B). We also excluded 
one outlier, which reported a joint performance of four standard deviations below the 
sample mean although the same firm reported above-average individual performance10 
of the vendors, suggesting an erroneous measurement. Our final sample size was n=189. 
Table 1 shows the sample characteristics. 
Measures 
Each construct was measured with a block of indicators (questionnaire items). Where 
possible, we used existing measures that we adapted to the study context [43]. All items 
were measured on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” (=1) to 
“strongly agree” (=5) with “neither agree nor disagree” (=3) as the mid-point. An 
overview of the constructs and measurement items is provided in Table 2. Joint 
performance was measured by six items (developed in IS outsourcing research) that 
focused on the degree to which the joint performance of the two vendors met the client’s 
expectations. Architectural knowledge was measured by three items that focused on the 
client’s knowledge in relation to the integration of the services delivered by the two 
                                                        
10 The survey included three items measuring individual performance (composite reliability .87), which were not used for this 
study. 
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vendors. Our measures of formal governance referred to the use of two key formal 
governance strategies in the IPV, i.e., procedures and goals [15, p.43-46]. The measures 
focused on the client’s efforts for specifying joint procedures and goals and for 
evaluating the vendors’ adherence to the procedures and goals. Our measures of 
informal governance focused on what IPV researchers call lateral relations, i.e., “direct 
contact between two people who share a problem” at the same hierarchical level [15, 
p.53]. These measures, adapted from Takeishi [43], assessed the amount of direct 
contact at three levels: IT staff, middle management, top management. To assess 
whether a guardian vendor model was chosen, we asked whether one of the two vendors 
was responsible for managing other vendors. The measures for our control variable 
modularity were taken from Tanriverdi et al. [44]. Table 3 provides an overview of the 
measures for control variables. 
Table 1: Sample Characteristics 
Characteristics of the Sample [Min; Max] Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Respondent work 
experience 
Number of years working in organization  [.5; 35] 8.6 (6.5) 
Age of multi-sourcing 
arrangement 
Years that have passed since the start of the 
multi-sourcing arrangement 
[1; 9] 3.7 (2.4) 
 Number Percentage 
Client size 
Up to 1,000 employees 70 37% 
1,001 to 5,000 employees 61 32% 
5,001 to 50,000 employees 46 24% 
More than 50,000 employees 12 6% 
Country 
United Kingdom 33 17% 
France 31 16% 
Germany 33 17% 
Italy 32 17% 
Spain 30 16% 
USA 30 16% 
Industry sector 
Financial services 34 18% 
Manufacturing 39 21% 
Retail, distribution and transport 25 13% 
Public sector 35 19% 
Other 56 30% 
Respondent’s area of work 
within client firm 
Owner/executive 22 12% 
Finance 18 10% 
IT 103 54% 
Facilities 5 3% 
Marketing 7 4% 
Customer services 15 8% 
Human resources 10 5% 
Logistics 9 5% 
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Table 2: Questionnaire Items (CR = composite reliability, AVE = average variance extracted) 
Construct Item Wording Reference 
Joint performance 
(CR = .90, AVE 
= .61) 
 With regard to combined performance of vendor A and vendor B as part 
of the multi-sourcing arrangement so far… 
 
JP1 … the products/services delivered meet our expectations. Grover et al. 
[21] JP2 … we have met our goals. 
JP3 … we have completed key milestones in accordance with our objectives. 
JP4 … we have achieved our desired cost savings. 
JP5 … we are satisfied with our overall benefits from outsourcing. Lee and Kim 
[30] 
JP6 … we have so far met project/service requirements. Tiwana [45] 
Architectural 
knowledge (CR = 
.88, AVE = .72) 
 The following questions are related to the level of knowledge of you and 
your in-house colleagues. We have knowledge about … 
 
AK1 … the design of the overall product and service architecture to which 
vendors A and B contribute. 
Takeishi [43]  
AK2 … how to structurally coordinate the products and services delivered by 
vendors A and B with all other related products and services of our 
organization. 
AK3 … the ways in which the products and services delivered by vendors A 
and B are integrated and linked together in a coherent whole. 
Henderson and 
Clark [23]  
Formal 
governance (CR 
= .90, AVE = 
.63) 
 To ensure that it is not the individual performance of vendor A and B, 
but rather their combined performance (i.e., solutions by vendor A and B 
in combination as part of the multi-sourcing arrangement) that meets our 
objectives, we … 
Kirsch et al. 
[28] 
FG1 … expect both vendors to follow an understandable written sequence of 
steps that defines interactions between these two vendors. 
FG2 … assess the extent to which both vendors interact in accordance to 
existing written procedures and practices when delivering the outsourced 
service. 
FG3 … evaluate the extent to which combined services are delivered as 
defined in the contract regardless of how this goal is accomplished. 
FG4 … test intermediary and/or final joint outcomes/deliverables against 
criteria defined in the contract, regardless of how this goal is achieved. 
FG5 … have several sources of objective data we can rely on. 
FG6 … have defined quantifiable measures depicting the extent to which 
combined objectives are achieved. 
FG7 … have defined accurate and reliable measures that indicate the extent to 
which the delivered services jointly meet our objectives. 
Informal 
governance (CR 
= .86, AVE = 
.66) 
IG1 Our IT staff interact jointly with both vendors’ IT personnel. Takeishi [43]  
IG2 Our middle managers interact jointly with both vendors’ middle 
managers. 
IG3 Our top managers/executives interact jointly with both vendors’ top 
managers/executives. 
Guardian versus 
Direct (single 
item) 
GU Are either of the two vendors responsible for managing all other vendors 
in the multi-sourcing arrangement? 
 Yes, vendor A   Guardian 
 Yes, vendor B  Guardian 
 No, this is our responsibility  Non-guardian 
 Other (please explain)   Manually coded11 
Self-developed 
 Modularity (CR 
=.81, AVE = .68) 
 
 Regarding the two tasks/projects outsourced to vendor A and B, …  
MO1 … it is very easy to combine their particular outcomes into a coherent 
whole. 
Tanriverdi et 
al. [44] 
MO2 … they have well-defined interfaces with each other. 
                                                        
11 Only one respondent selected the “Other” category. The comment suggested than a third vendor (not vendor A or B) was 
responsible for managing the other vendors. We therefore coded this response as a guardian model.  
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Table 3: Control Variables 
Variable Measurement 
Concentration The fraction of the overall budget of the multi-sourcing arrangement 
that is assigned to vendors A and B; measured through a single-item 
question 
Modularity Measured through two questionnaire items (see Table 2) 
Age of the multi-sourcing arrangement The number of years since the start of the multi-sourcing 
arrangement; measured through a single-item question 
Client size The client’s number of employees; measured through a single-item 
question (transformation: natural logarithm) 
Country Single-item question on the client’s country (United Kingdom, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, USA, France); incorporated through five 
dichotomous dummy variables (reference category: France) 
Industry Single-item question on the client’s sector (financial services, 
manufacturing, retail, public sector, other); incorporated through four 
dichotomous dummy variables (reference category: Other) 
Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) Indicates whether business processes (other than IT) were part of the 
outsourced tasks; coded based on task descriptions 
Application Development Indicates whether the development of application software was part 
of the outsourced tasks; coded based on task descriptions 
 
Instrument Validation 
To validate our survey instrument, we assessed convergent and discriminant validity 
through factor analysis procedures. To examine convergent validity, we first performed 
an exploratory factor analysis in SPSS. This analysis reproduced the five latent factors 
of our research model with eigenvalues greater than 1.6. Eigenvalues greater than 1 
suggest convergent validity [16]. To further corroborate convergent validity, we 
calculated composite reliability (CR), average variance extracted (AVE), and 
standardized factor loadings, using confirmatory factor analysis procedures in 
SmartPLS [16]. CR was well above the threshold of .7 for all constructs (see Table 2). 
AVE was well above the threshold of .5 for all constructs (see Table 2). The 
standardized factor loadings were greater than .7 with the exceptions of FG1 (.66) and 
FG4 (.65), which were close to the threshold. These two slightly lower values could be 
due to our attempt to capture formal governance as broadly and comprehensively as 
possible. By and large, the measurement evidence supports convergent validity.  
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We then examined discriminant validity. We tested whether each item loaded higher 
on its construct than on any other construct [16]. For each item, the difference between 
the loading of the item on its construct and the cross-loading of the item on any other 
construct was above .2. Moreover, we examined whether the square roots of the AVE 
values exceeded correlations between latent constructs [16]. The square root of the 
lowest AVE value (.75 for formal governance) was well above the highest correlation 
between two latent constructs (.60 for the correlation between joint performance and 
formal governance). These results, and the fact that exploratory factor analysis 
reproduced the five latent factors, strongly support discriminant validity.  
Regression Analysis 
We used a regression approach to test our hypotheses. Given our focus on interaction 
effects, we chose regression over alternative approaches, such as partial least squares 
(PLS) and covariance-based structural equation modeling (SEM). Regression offers 
higher statistical power for detecting interaction effects than PLS or covariance-based 
SEM [18]. The advantage gained in statistical power is particularly pronounced in 
models such as ours, in which many items are subject to interaction effects [18, p. 222]. 
We relied on standardized mean scores to transform sets of items into regression 
variables. 
We used a four-step hierarchical regression strategy. In the first step (Model 1), we 
included the main effects of control variables. In the second step (Model 2), we added 
the main effects of the hypothesized predictors. In the third step (Model 3), we added 
the interactions of IP requirements (i.e., modularity) with sources of IP capacity (i.e., 
formal and informal governance, architectural knowledge, guardian model) to control 
for interaction effects established in the IPV research. In the fourth step (Model 4), we 
added the hypothesized interaction effects.  
 27 
We examined whether the assumptions of regression analyses were met [50, pp. 104-
105]. The histograms and q-q plots showed that the residuals followed normal 
distributions, indicating that the assumption of normally distributed error terms was 
met. Variance inflation factors were below 3, suggesting that multicollinearity 
problems were not salient in the data. Plotting residuals and joint performance in a 
scatter plot diagram showed no departure from the assumption of homoscedastic error 
terms.  
Although our study focused on interaction effects which cannot be artifacts of common-
method variance [e.g., 41], we performed Harman’s single factor test to appreciate 
whether item responses varied due to one single factor. We found that a single factor 
was able to explain 26% of the variance and that five factors were needed to explain 
half of the variance. Given these results and our focus on interaction effects, it is 
unlikely that the findings reported in this study are artifacts of common-method 
variance. 
To assess potential endogeneity threats in our analysis, we estimated alternative models 
based on Heckman correction for self-selection. Specifically, it is possible that clients 
self-select the guardian model based on factors that also correlate with joint 
performance (e.g., vendor capability). This could result in biased, inconsistent estimates 
[22]. Following prior research on governance [32], we performed the following steps 
to correct for the potentially endogenous choice of the guardian model. First, we 
estimated a first-stage probit selection model that regressed the choice of the guardian 
model on all main-effect predictors of the second-stage model and on BPO. BPO served 
as an exclusion restriction, i.e., as a variable that helps predict the selection variable 
(i.e., choice of the guardian model) but does not correlate with the dependent variable 
(i.e., joint performance)[11]. We chose BPO as our exclusion restriction because the 
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guardian model has only recently gained popularity in IS outsourcing. Hence, we 
expected that BPO arrangements would make greater use of the guardian model than 
IS outsourcing arrangements, while we had no reason to expect that BPO arrangements 
would differ from IS outsourcing arrangements in their level of joint performance. In 
line with these ideas, BPO correlated strongly with the choice of the guardian model 
(ß=.82;p<.01) but not with joint performance (p>.05). Second, we calculated the 
inverse Mills ratio for each observation as follows: 
𝜆1𝑖 =
𝜑(𝛽′𝑋𝑖)
𝜙(𝛽′𝑋𝑖)
 for arrangements that chose a guardian model 
𝜆0𝑖 = −
𝜑(𝛽′𝑋𝑖)
(1−𝜙(𝛽′𝑋𝑖))
 for arrangements that chose a direct model  
where 𝜆𝑗𝑖is the inverse Mills ratio, 𝜑 the standard normal probability density function, 
𝛽′the vector of regression coefficients estimated by the probit selection model and 𝜙 
the cumulated standard normal probability function. Third, we included the inverse 
Mills ratio as a control variable in the second-stage model predicting joint performance. 
The Heckman correction approach helps control for the client’s propensity to choose a 
guardian model. Moreover, the regression coefficient related to the inverse Mills ratio 
serves as an indicator for the presence of endogeneity. If the coefficient is significantly 
different from 0, this indicates that endogeneity is present and, hence, should be 
corrected for by including the inverse Mills ratio as a control variable. We estimated 
alternative models based on Heckman correction (Model 2b, 3b, 4b) for each model 
that contained the guardian model as a predictor (i.e., Model 2a, 3a, 4a). 
To examine nonresponse bias, we compared the means of eight key variables (joint 
performance, modularity, concentration, age of the arrangement, formal governance, 
informal governance, architectural knowledge, guardian) between multi-sourcing 
arrangements that were in our sample and multi-sourcing arrangements not included in 
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the sample (most frequently due to the respondents’ lack of willingness to provide 
descriptions of the outsourced tasks). Comparisons revealed no significant differences 
with the exception of formal governance, which was somewhat higher in the 
arrangements included in the final sample than in those excluded (3.99 vs. 3.82; t test; 
n=369; p < .05). With only one of eight comparisons yielding a significant difference, 
we inferred that nonresponse bias was unlikely to be a serious threat to the validity of 
our analysis.  
RESULTS 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics, separated by guardian versus direct subsamples. 
The only significant differences referred to business process outsourcing, which was 
more frequent in the guardian sample, and informal governance, which was stronger in 
the guardian sample. Table 5 presents bivariate correlations.  
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Sample Comparison  
 Direct sample: Mean 
(standard deviation) 
Guardian sample: Mean 
(standard deviation) 
Difference statistically 
significant 
Joint performance 4.06 (.65) 4.02 (.75) No 
Concentration 52.17 (31.49) 55.63 (29.28) No 
Modularity 3.72 (.83) 3.96 (.88) No 
Age of arrangement  3.76 (2.44) 3.44 (2.29) No 
Client size  7.88 (1.80) 8.03 (1.56) No 
Business process outsourcing .56 (50) .82 (.38) Yes (p < .05) 
Application development .20 (.40) .11 (.31) No 
Formal governance 3.93 (.74) 4.12 (.56) No 
Informal governance 2.73 (1.06) 3.12 (.96) Yes (p < . 05) 
Architectural knowledge 4.03 (.76) 4.19 (.66) No 
Sub-sample size (n) 132 57 - 
 
Table 5: Bivariate Correlations (*p < .05) 
 
Joint 
perf. 
Con. Mo. Age Cl. 
size 
BPO App. 
Dev. 
Grd. Form. 
gov. 
Inf. 
gov. 
Arch. 
knowl. 
Joint performance 1           
Concentration .03 1          
Modularity .44* .13* 1         
Age of arrangement .07 -.09 .07 1        
Client size -.05 .08 .05 .20* 1       
BPO .12 .10 .15* .14* -.10 1      
Appl. Development -.12 -.10 -.12 -.03 .05 -.38* 1     
Guardian -.02 .05 .13 -.06 .04 .25* -.12 1    
Formal governance .58* .03 .40* .01 -.07 .13 -.14 .12 1   
Informal governance .12 .09 .09 .11 .04 .12 .00 .17* .15* 1  
Architectural 
knowledge 
.52* -.10 .29* .04 .07 .03 -.01 .10 .57* .16* 1 
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The results of our four-step regression are presented in Table 6. The first column 
(Model 1) presents results related to our control variables. Modularity (ß=.44; p<.001) 
had significant positive associations with joint performance while the other control 
variables shown in Table 6 were insignificant.  
Table 6: Regression Results 
 Model 1 Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a 
(Constant) -.29 (.23) -.13 (.19) -.03 (.19) -.13 (.19) 
Concentration -.03 (.07) .02 (.06) .15* (.07) .17* (.07) 
Modularity .43*** (.07) .23*** (.06) .25** (.08) .24** (.08) 
Age of arrangement -.02 (.07) -.01 (.06) .01 (.06) .01 (.06) 
Client Size -.06 (.07) -.04 (.06) -.06 (.06) -.04 (.06) 
Business Process Outsourcing .06 (.16) .10 (.14) .08 (.14) .06 (.13) 
Application Development -.11 (.19) -.08 (.16) -.08 (.16) -.07 (.15) 
Inverse Mills Ratio - - - - 
Guardian - -.31* (.13) -.32* (.13) -.37** (.13) 
Formal governance - .31*** (.07) .26*** (.07) .18* (.08) 
Informal governance - .00 (.06) .02 (.06) -.07 (.06) 
Architectural knowledge - .29*** (.07) .34*** (.07) .46*** (.08) 
Modularity × Guardian - - .00 (.13) -.04 (.14) 
Modularity × Formal governance - - -.11 (.07) -.12 (.07) 
Modularity × Informal governance - - .06 (.05) -.02 (.06) 
Modularity × Client’s architectural knowledge - - .02 (.07) .03 (.07) 
Concentration × Guardian - - -.42** (.13) -.46*** (.13) 
Formal governance × Client’s architectural 
knowledge 
- - - 
-.01 (.06) 
Informal governance × Client’s architectural 
knowledge  
- - - 
.13* (.06) 
Guardian × Formal governance - - - .42* (.19) 
Guardian × Informal governance - - - .38** (.14) 
Guardian × Client’s architectural knowledge  - - - -.52** (.17) 
Adjusted R2 
R2  
ΔR2 
F Change (d.f.) 
.21 
.27 
.27 
4.34*** (15, 
173)   
.44 
.49 
.22 
18.33*** 
(4,169)  
.47 
.54 
.05 
3.20*** (5, 
164) 
.51 
.59 
.05 
3.63** (5, 159) 
(*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, results for dummy variables related to country and industry omitted) 
The second column (Model 2a) shows the main effects of our four predictors (i.e., the 
sources of IP capacity), allowing us to test H1 and H2. H1 predicts positive main effects 
for formal and informal governance on joint performance. We found a significant 
positive effect for formal governance (ß=.31; p<.001), but not for informal governance 
(ß=.00; p>.05). Hence, H1 is partially supported. H2 predicts a positive main effect of 
architectural knowledge on joint performance. We found a significant positive effect 
(ß=.29; p<.001), supporting H2. Although we did not hypothesize a main effect of the 
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presence of the guardian vendor on joint performance, Model 2a showed a significant 
negative main effect (ß=-.31; p<.05). 
Before adding the hypothesized interaction effects, we controlled for possible 
interactions of our hypothesized sources of IP capacity with modularity (in order to 
reflect IP requirements), and for the interaction of concentration with the choice of the 
guardian model. As the third column (Model 3a) shows, none of interactions of sources 
of IP capacity with modularity were significant. Conversely, we found a significant 
negative interaction effect of concentration with the choice of the guardian model 
(ß=-.42; p<.01).  
The fourth column (Model 4a) presents the results of our full model, which includes 
the interaction effects hypothesized in H3 to H5. H3 predicts positive interaction effects 
of formal/informal inter-vendor governance and the client’s architectural knowledge. 
As can be seen, only the interaction between informal inter-vendor governance and the 
client’s architectural knowledge was significant and positive (ß=.13; p<.05), thus 
partially supporting H3. Following the guardian-as-a-mediator perspective, H4 predicts 
negative interaction effects between the choice of the guardian model and the client’s 
formal/informal inter-vendor governance (H4a), and with the client’s architectural 
knowledge (H4b). As Model 4a shows, we found positive rather than negative 
interaction effects of the guardian model with formal (ß=.42; p<.05) and informal 
(ß=.38; p<.01) inter-vendor governance. H4a is thus rejected. In line with H4b, the 
interaction effects between the guardian model and architectural knowledge were 
significant (ß=-.52; p<.01). While the results do not fully align with the predictions 
derived from the guardian-as-a-mediator perspective, they do align with the predictions 
derived from the guardian-as-an-architect perspective. In line with H5a, we found 
significant positive interaction effects of the guardian model with formal (ß=.42; p<.05) 
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and informal (ß=.38; p<.01) inter-vendor governance. Moreover and in line with H5b, 
we found significant negative interaction effects of the guardian model with 
architectural knowledge (ß=-.52; p<.01).  
Overall, our full model (Model 4a) showed the strongest explanatory power (adjusted 
R2=.51) of all the tested models (see the bottom of Table 6). The hypothesized 
interaction effects between sources of IP capacity (from Model 3 to Model 4) added 
statistically significant amounts of explained variance (ΔR2 = .05; ΔF = 3.63; p < .01), 
supporting the relevancy of interaction effects expressed in H3 and H5. 
To examine threats of endogeneity, alternative model specifications based on Heckman 
correction were undertaken and are reported in Table 7. Hypothesis testing based on 
these alternative models yielded coefficient signs and significance levels that were 
identical to those resulting from models 2a and 4a. Moreover, the Inverse Mills Ratio 
was insignificant (p>.05) in all models. This suggests that the support found for our 
hypotheses is unlikely to be a statistical artefact of the potentially endogenous choice 
of the guardian model12.  
Table 7: Results of Alternative Models based on Heckman Correction 
 Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b 
(Constant) -.21 (.23) -.12 (.23) -.15 (.22) 
Concentration .03 (.06) .15* (.07) .17 (.07) 
Modularity .22** (.06) .24** (.08) .24** (.08) 
Age of arrangement .02 (.07) .04 (.06) .02 (.06) 
Client Size -.06 (.06) -.08 (.06) -.05 (.06) 
Application Development -.07 (.16) -.06 (.16) -.07 (.15) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -.31 (.32) -.29 (.31) -.13 (.31) 
                                                        
12 We performed two further analyses to examine threats of endogeneity. First, to examine whether clients deliberately chose 
highly capable vendors as their guardian vendors, we compared the clients’ assessment of the vendors’ individual (rather than 
joint) performance (measured through three items not used in this study, composite reliability .87). Individual performance was 
very similar for guardian vendors and for non-guardian vendors, with average standardized scores of -.02 for guardian vendors 
and .00 for non-guardian vendors (difference not statistically significant). This suggests that clients did not select highly capable 
vendors as their guardian vendors. Second, we estimated a switching regression model, using the movestay command in Stata 
[11]. The switching regression model produced results that were highly consistent with the results from OLS regression. 
Specifically, the differences between coefficients in sub-sample with guardian model and the coefficients in sub-sample with 
direct model were highly similar to interaction coefficients obtained from OLS regression (architectural knowledge: difference 
between coefficients in switching regression of  -.55 compared to an OLS interaction effect of -.52; formal governance: difference 
between coefficients in switching regression of .37 compared to OLS interaction effect of .42; informal governance: difference 
between coefficients in switching regression of .35 versus OLS interaction effect .38). 
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Guardian -.20 (.52) -.17 (.17) -.14 (.51) 
Formal governance .30*** (.07) .25*** (.07) .18* (.08) 
Informal governance -.03 (.07) .00 (.07) -.08 (.07) 
Architectural knowledge .27*** (.07) .33*** (.07) .46*** (.08) 
Modularity × Guardian - -.00 (.13) -.05 (.14) 
Modularity × Formal governance - -.12 (.07) -.12 (.07) 
Modularity × Informal governance - .06 (.05) -.02 (.06) 
Modularity × Client’s architectural knowledge - .02 (.07) .03 (.07) 
Concentration × Guardian - -.42** (.13) -.46*** (.13) 
Formal governance × Client’s architectural knowledge - - -.01 (.06) 
Informal governance × Client’s architectural knowledge  - - .13* (.07) 
Guardian × Formal governance - - .42* (.19) 
Guardian × Informal governance - - .37** (.14) 
Guardian × Client’s architectural knowledge  - - -.52** (.17) 
Adjusted R2 
R2  
.44 
.49 
.47 
.54 
.51 
.59 
 
(*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, results for dummy variables related to country and industry omitted) 
 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to examine joint performance in multi-sourcing 
arrangements in light of the interdependencies between multiple vendors. Indeed, 
multi-sourcing has become a dominant sourcing model attracting growing attention in 
the IS community [6, 31, 49]. While multi-sourcing offers client firms numerous 
advantages through a competitive and yet cooperative regime, it also poses new 
challenges, mainly in the form of interdependencies that require the client firm to 
increase its efforts to achieve coordination and cooperation. Building on key IPV 
concepts, we framed these efforts as greater IP requirements. Given these IP 
requirements, a critical challenge in multi-sourcing arrangements is to generate 
sufficient IP capacity. In this regard, we proposed two possible sources of IP capacity. 
The first, the direct model (see Figure 1a), relies on internal sources of IP capacity only, 
seeking to leverage the client’s formal and informal governance and architectural 
knowledge. The second, the guardian model (see Figure 1b), relies both on internal 
sources and on the use of a guardian vendor as a means of providing additional IP 
capacity.   
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Direct Model 
Our results regarding the direct model (i.e., the client alone managing the multi-
sourcing arrangement) suggest that both formal inter-vendor governance and 
architectural knowledge lead to higher joint performance. In particular, each of these 
two sources of IP capacity (as captured in H1 and H2) individually equip the client firm 
with the IP capacity needed to manage interdependencies in the multi-sourcing 
arrangement. The results for the direct model highlight the importance of formal inter-
vendor governance based on written procedures and the contractual agreement structure 
(e.g., objective and quantifiable measures) as a means of coping with coordination and 
integration efforts between vendors, manifested here as an IP challenge. Interestingly, 
formal inter-vendor governance seems to be an effective strategy irrespective of the 
client’s level of architectural knowledge (see the insignificant interaction effect of 
formal inter-vendor governance and client’s architectural knowledge).  
On the other hand, informal inter-vendor governance seems to be effective only when 
the client has strong architectural knowledge (see the insignificant main effect of 
informal inter-vendor governance and the significant positive interaction effect of 
informal inter-vendor governance and client’s architectural knowledge). The 
interaction plot depicted in Figure 3 below further illustrates the relationships. When a 
client possesses strong architectural knowledge (i.e., one standard deviation above the 
mean), greater informal inter-vendor governance is associated with higher joint 
performance. Conversely, when a client possesses weak architectural knowledge (i.e., 
one standard deviation below the mean), greater informal inter-vendor governance is 
associated with lower joint performance. The lack of a positive main effect of informal 
inter-vendor governance is rather surprising, given that the IS outsourcing literature has 
persistently found a positive effect of informal governance (often viewed as relational 
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governance) on outsourcing performance in dyadic settings [e.g., 36]. One possible 
explanation for the surprising result in our study is that informal inter-vendor 
governance in triadic relationships is different from informal governance in dyadic 
relationships. Having more than two parties involved may erode the sense of being 
“informal” and make all parties involved feel part of a “formal” relationship. The sense 
of competition [49] between the vendors is also likely to contribute to such a “formal” 
attitude. The relational benefits seen in dyadic settings, therefore, may be less 
pronounced in multi-sourcing settings.  
 
Figure 3: Informal governance affecting joint performance under strong versus weak client’s architectural 
knowledge 
Guardian Model 
We found joint performance in arrangements using a guardian model to be very similar 
to arrangements using a direct model (4.06 versus 4.02 in a five-point scale, see the first 
row in Table 4). Nonetheless, we also found two significant interaction effects, 
suggesting that the effectiveness of the guardian model is contingent on the two internal 
sources of IP capacity. 
Our results support the perspective that the guardian can best be utilized as an architect 
rather than as a mediator. Indeed, we found a complementary effect between the 
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guardian vendor and the client’s governance and a substitutive effect between the 
guardian vendor and the client’s architectural knowledge, supporting our hypotheses 
derived from the guardian-as-an-architect perspective.  
The interaction plot depicted in Figure 4 illustrates the complementary effect of the 
guardian model and inter-vendor governance. A guardian model is likely to diminish 
joint performance when the client firm exercises weak formal and informal inter-vendor 
governance (see Figure 4). Yet, the negative effect of the guardian model is reversed to 
positive when the client firm has strong formal and informal inter-vendor governance 
mechanisms in place. Therefore, in multi-sourcing settings, the internal IP capacity of 
governance (formal and informal) is required by the client in order to gain the benefits 
of the external IP capacity of architectural knowledge brought by the guardian vendor. 
This demonstrates the complementary effect of these two sources of IP capacity. 
 
Figure 4: Guardian model (versus direct model) affecting joint performance under strong versus weak 
governance 
 
Our results also suggest a substitutive effect between the guardian’s and the client’s 
architectural knowledge, as illustrated by the interaction plot depicted in Figure 5.  The 
guardian model improves joint performance when clients have weak architectural 
knowledge, while it worsens performance when clients have strong architectural 
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knowledge. Indeed, these results suggest a substitutive effect between the IP capacity 
brought forward by the guardian vendor and the client’s architectural knowledge. In 
this regard, the guardian model compensates for the client’s weak in-house architectural 
knowledge and, therefore, a client with weak architectural knowledge may benefit from 
the guardian’s ability to integrate interdependent sub-tasks in multi-sourcing 
arrangements. Conversely, clients who possess strong architectural knowledge may 
benefit to a much lesser extent from the guardian’s integration ability. 
 
Figure 5: Guardian model (versus direct model) affecting joint performance under strong versus weak client’s 
architectural knowledge   
 
We found additional support for the perspective of ‘guardian-as-an-architect. As 
depicted in Figure 6, the joint performance of the multi-sourcing arrangement will be 
higher should a client with weak architectural knowledge choose a guardian model and 
exercise strong formal and informal governance. On the other hand, a client with strong 
architectural knowledge will benefit from using the direct model, as Figure 7 depicts. 
Interestingly, both Figure 6 and 7 show that joint performance is at its lowest when the 
client chooses a guardian model and exercises weak inter-vendor governance. This is 
precisely the configuration prescribed by the guardian-as-a-mediator perspective. 
Irrespective of whether the client’s architectural knowledge is high or low, employing 
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a guardian-as-a-mediator model is likely to result in low levels of joint performance. 
These findings bear important implications for theory and practice, on which we 
elaborate next.  
 
Figure 6: Governance affecting joint performance under direct versus guardian model and under client’s 
weak architectural knowledge 
 
 
Figure 7: Governance affecting joint performance under direct versus guardian model and under client’s 
strong architectural knowledge 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
Theoretical Contributions 
This paper offers two main contributions to the IS outsourcing literature. First, to our 
best knowledge, this is the first study to model and test determinants of joint 
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performance in IS multi-sourcing arrangements. While the IS outsourcing literature has, 
by and large, examined dyadic relationships as a basis for understanding the 
determinants of outsourcing success [14], our study assumed interdependencies 
between multiple vendors, thus requiring an examination of triadic relationships at the 
minimum. As interdependencies may affect the likelihood of multi-sourcing success, 
formal and informal inter-vendor governance and architectural knowledge were 
examined as two key antecedents. Our study shows that while formal inter-vendor 
governance and the client’s architectural knowledge are likely to improve multi-
sourcing success, informal governance, often referred to as relational governance in the 
IS literature and considered key in achieving dyadic IS outsourcing success, shows no 
direct effect on joint performance. Our results show a positive effect of informal 
governance on joint performance only in conjunction with high levels of client’s 
architectural knowledge, or with the choice of a guardian model. These results suggest 
that multi-sourcing does not simply mimic dyadic outsourcing at a larger scale. Its 
inherent independencies require unique governance mechanisms and associated 
abilities (i.e., architectural knowledge) directed towards the interface between vendors.  
The second contribution of this study is in offering insights into the role that a guardian 
vendor plays in a multi-sourcing arrangement. Bapna et al. [4] noted that, although the 
choice for or against a guardian model is one of the key design choices in multi-sourcing 
arrangements, “[t]here is little in the academic literature on the guardian vendor model” 
(p. 794). They called for research to examine “[w]hat aspects of the engagement should 
be handled by the guardian vendor and the client” (p. 794). Wiener and Saunders [49] 
argue that the guardian model can be regarded as a “mediated model”, wherein the 
guardian vendor acts as a “single point of contact” (p. 213), mediating the interaction 
between the client and the remaining vendors. This would imply that the only actor 
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responsible for governing interdependencies between vendors is the guardian vendor. 
Our results, however, show that it can be perilous for the client to withdraw from 
governance efforts and mandate these to the guardian vendor. In fact, the least 
successful multi-sourcing arrangements in our sample were those where the client 
appointed a guardian vendor and then exercised weak joint formal and informal 
governance (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). In other words, the clients who practiced the 
guardian-as-a-mediator model were the least successful. We therefore theorized an 
alternative role in which the guardian acts as an architect.  
Our results do indeed suggest that a guardian vendor may be better understood as an 
architect than as a mediator. Much like the architect of a building contributes 
knowledge of how the elements of a building fit with each other, the guardian-as-an-
architect contributes knowledge as to how the sub-tasks of a multi-sourcing 
arrangement can be integrated. Two findings support the guardian-as-an-architect view. 
First, clients who lack architectural knowledge are particularly likely to benefit from 
the inclusion of a guardian vendor, suggesting that the guardian vendor compensates 
for the client’s knowledge gaps. Second, just like the client’s architectural knowledge 
enables more effective informal governance, so does utilizing the guardian vendor as 
an architect too. Informal inter-vendor governance involves complex ad hoc 
communication and decisions by the client, requiring considerable architectural 
knowledge in order to be exercised effectively. This knowledge may come either from 
the client, or from a guardian-as-an-architect to support the client in informal 
governance efforts. Thus, a guardian vendor complements the client’s formal and 
informal inter-vendor governance while substituting the client’s architectural 
knowledge. As such, the guardian model does not relieve clients from governance (as 
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assumed in the guardian-as-mediator model), but it does help them compensate for 
knowledge gaps.  
Another contribution of this study revolves around the body of research that explains 
the choice and effectiveness of governance mechanisms through an IPV lens. Indeed, 
the IPV-based literature stream on governance mostly argues that the choice of 
governance mechanisms determines the IP capacity of an organization, and that such 
IP capacity should fit IP requirements [2, 27, 32]. Although another literature stream 
implicitly argues that architectural knowledge is an important source of IP capacity in 
inter-organizational relationships [7, 24, 38, 43], these two literature streams have 
mostly developed in isolation. As a consequence, interactions between governance and 
knowledge have rarely been considered in IPV research. Conversely, a key argument 
of our study is that governance mechanisms, such as goal setting, planning, and direct 
interaction, enable effective IP to the extent that these mechanisms are enacted or 
assisted by a knowledgeable party.  
Practical Implications 
Our study offers specific recommendations for practice. Clients in multi-sourcing 
arrangements should consider their architectural knowledge when deciding for or 
against the guardian model. Clients with strong architectural knowledge (i.e., clients 
who understand well how the various sub-tasks outsourced to different vendors relate 
to each other) are advised to choose a direct model, whereas clients with weak 
architectural knowledge are better off with a guardian model. Although clients may 
believe that having a guardian model means they can economise on or relinquish 
governance efforts, this is not the case. Instead, clients are well advised to engage in 
extensive formal and informal governance efforts that involve all vendors. Specifically, 
clients should define and monitor the joint outcomes to be achieved and the joint 
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procedures to be followed, and they should also put emphasis on informally interacting 
with all involved vendors at various levels. Importantly, extensive governance efforts 
are essential, both in a direct model, where the clients can leverage their own knowledge 
during informal governance in particular, and in a guardian model, where the guardian 
vendor should bring in additional knowledge to enable effective governance by the 
client. 
Limitations and Future Research  
There are several limitations to this study that may encourage future research. First, 
while this is one of the first studies to examine the effect of the guardian on a multi-
sourcing arrangement, our study sheds little light on what exactly the guardian vendor 
does and what information capacities the guardian vendor brings to the multi-sourcing 
arrangement. Consequently, following on our guardian-as-an-architect perspective, our 
study provides a number of fruitful directions for future research. Future studies could 
take a practice-view and explicitly examine and document the IP requirements that 
multi-sourcing settings face. Consequently, future research could study the activities 
performed by the guardian vendor vis-à-vis the IP requirements, as well as in steering 
the relationships with the client and with other vendors in multi-sourcing arrangements. 
Building on this, future studies could also explore the relationship between the nature 
of the task (simple or complex) and the implications for the architectural knowledge 
and governance efforts that the guardian vendor contributes to multi-sourcing 
arrangements. Our study calls for a more in-depth examination of the practices and the 
knowledge contributions of the guardian vendor.  
Second, while our measures of formal and informal inter-vendor governance were 
closely linked to the IPV, they did not include some mechanisms of contractual 
governance, such as contract duration and contract type. Future research could integrate 
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these mechanisms into IPV conceptualizations. Moreover, although we focused on the 
client’s inter-vendor governance (i.e., governance involving all vendors at the same 
time), we did not contrast inter-vendor governance efforts to governance efforts that 
involve only one vendor at a time (such as an SLA applicable for a single vendor only). 
We also see an opportunity for further research around the role of the client in a 
guardian vendor model. For example, drawing on our finding that informal governance 
– with the involvement of the client – complements the role of the guardian in achieving 
high levels of joint performance, a future study could zoom into such informal meetings 
and explore the activities performed by the client and the knowledge needed. Such a 
study could, in fact, explore the evolution of triadic relationships between client, 
guardian and other vendors and how their actions and knowledge evolve over time [8].  
Ultimately, such zooming into the client and guardian vendor roles would also further 
address our call for a more in-depth understanding of the interactions between IP 
capacities, by studying interactions not only between capacities, e.g., informal and 
formal governance, but also between the underlying knowledge and the practices 
needed to bring such capacities to fruition. 
CONCLUSIONS  
The main objective in this paper was to examine joint-vendor performance in multi-
sourcing. In particular, we took interest in understanding joint-vendor performance in 
two common multi-sourcing settings, namely, the direct model and the guardian model. 
Using the logic of the Information Processing View, we theoretically developed the 
idea that information processing capacity in multi-sourcing can be internal, i.e. the 
client’s inter-vendor governance and the client’s architectural knowledge, and external, 
i.e., the guardian vendor. To discover how these 3 sources of IP capacities affect joint-
vendor performance as well as interact with each other, we tested our model using an 
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international data set of 189 IT multi-sourcing arrangements. We found that in the direct 
model, the client’s formal inter-vendor governance and the client’s architectural 
knowledge positively affect joint performance. We also found that a guardian vendor 
complements the client’s formal and informal inter-vendor governance while 
substituting the client’s architectural knowledge. These results suggest that the 
guardian’s role is best understood as an architect, i.e. beneficial in terms of architectural 
knowledge, rather than as a mediator, i.e. beneficial in terms of inter-vendor governance. 
Put simply, client firms should consider using a guardian vendor to compensate for 
weak architectural knowledge while still maintaining strong formal and informal 
governance of all vendors. 
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